The year 1689 marked the beginning of a prolonged and bitter struggle between Britain and France, a conflict that spanned over a century and is often referred to as the Second Hundred Years' War. This enduring rivalry was not confined to Europe alone; it found expression across the Atlantic in the New World, where the colonial outposts of both empires became battlegrounds in a global conflict. That year, the War of the League of Augsburg, known in the American colonies as King William’s War, erupted in Europe, and soon its flames spread to the wilderness of North America. The contest between French and English colonists was fueled by a potent mixture of territorial ambition and religious hatred, with Puritan New England and Catholic New France clashing not just over land but over their very identities.
For the French colony, 1689 was a year of fortunate timing, as it saw the return of the old and formidable Count Louis de Buade de Frontenac as Governor of New France. At the age of 69, Frontenac was a seasoned soldier and diplomat, having already served a term as governor from 1672 to 1682. His return at such a critical juncture was nothing short of providential for New France. With the colony under constant threat from its English neighbors and the Indigenous allies they sought to sway, it needed a leader of Frontenac’s caliber—one capable of both inspiring his people and organizing a defense against overwhelming odds. Frontenac was the man for the job, perhaps the most stout-hearted defender New France would ever know.
One of Frontenac’s first acts upon his return was to strike before the English could marshal their forces. During the brutal winter of 1689-90, he dispatched three war parties into the snow-covered wilderness, targeting the English frontiers in New England and New York. These raids were not mere skirmishes; they were bold and devastating strikes meant to unnerve the English and remind them of France’s reach in the New World. The attacks on Schenectady, Salmon Falls, and Casco Bay were brutal in their execution, leaving a trail of death and destruction that resonated throughout the English colonies. These blows, delivered in the dead of winter, goaded New England and New York into action. The English were outraged, and their leaders resolved to respond with an ambitious campaign to rid North America of the French threat once and for all.
By 1690, the English colonies, driven by revenge and their growing fear of French expansion, devised a grand plan to strike at the heart of New France. Their target was Quebec, the seat of French power in the New World and the most fortified city on the continent. The English colonies possessed a clear advantage in population and wealth, their combined numbers far outstripping those of the French settlers in Canada. Yet, for all their strength, the English colonies were hamstrung by their disunity. The various colonies, from Massachusetts to New York, were riddled with internal divisions, mutual jealousy, and competing priorities. Their disorganized and decentralized governments made it difficult to mount a coordinated military effort, and this disunity would prove to be one of their greatest weaknesses.
In contrast, New France, though smaller and less populous, benefited from a more centralized and autocratic system of governance. The French colony, under Frontenac’s firm leadership, was able to marshal its resources efficiently and mount a coordinated defense. The colony’s autocratic system, though a hindrance to its long-term development, proved advantageous in times of war. With Frontenac at the helm, the French were able to resist their far more numerous English neighbors, not only in 1690 but for generations afterward. This resilience in the face of superior numbers was a hallmark of New France’s defense throughout the colonial wars. Ultimately, when New France did fall, it was not to the disjointed efforts of the English colonies, but to a massive British military expedition supported by the full might of the Royal Navy—a force that the colonies could never have mustered on their own.
The English plan for the campaign of 1690 was modeled on the kind of grand strategies that would later prove successful in the Seven Years’ War. It called for a two-pronged assault on New France. The first prong was an overland expedition, which would move up the Hudson River and along Lake Champlain to strike at Montreal, the second-largest city of New France and a key hub of its fur trade. The second prong was a seaborne attack that would sail up the St. Lawrence River and assault Quebec directly. If successful, this plan would sever New France’s two most vital cities and deliver a crippling blow to French power in North America.
Command of the seaborne expedition was given to Sir William Phips, a man who, though celebrated in Massachusetts, was ill-suited for such a complex military operation. Phips, often described as a "rude sailor," had earned his knighthood not through military accomplishments but through his successful recovery of treasure from a wrecked Spanish galleon. His lack of military experience was evident, and while his leadership in salvage operations had garnered him fame, it did little to prepare him for the intricacies of leading an amphibious assault on a fortified city like Quebec. Nevertheless, Phips was chosen to lead the expedition, likely due to his local popularity and the dearth of other experienced commanders in the colonies.
The land expedition against Montreal was beset by logistical difficulties from the outset, and Phips’ seaborne attack fared no better. The New England militia, largely made up of farmers and tradesmen with little formal military training, was ill-prepared for the scale of the operation. The coordination required between the land forces and the fleet was beyond the capabilities of the colonial forces, and the vast distances and difficult terrain only compounded the problems. Quebec, perched on its cliffs overlooking the St. Lawrence, was a fortress by nature as well as by design, and it was defended by a seasoned army under Frontenac’s command.
The failure of Phips’ expedition to capture Quebec would go down in history as one of the early dramatic episodes in Canadian history. It underscored the limits of colonial military power, revealing that while the English colonies had the population and the wealth, they lacked the unity, experience, and coordination necessary to carry out large-scale military operations. New France, under the leadership of Frontenac, would hold firm for decades to come, its people fortified by the belief that they could withstand whatever their English neighbors threw at them.
In the broader scope of history, this failed expedition of 1690 was but the opening act of a much longer and bloodier conflict between Britain and France in North America. The rivalry between the two colonial powers would continue for more than a century, culminating in the fall of New France in 1763. But for now, in 1690, the defense of Quebec stood as a testament to the strength of New France and the resilience of its people under the leadership of Frontenac, a leader whose legacy would loom large over the coming wars.
Cite Article : Reference: www.canadahistory.com/sections/documents/documents.html
Source: NA