Confederation, while celebrated as a monumental achievement in Canadian history, was not universally welcomed. In fact, significant opposition arose, particularly in the Maritime provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, where anti-Confederation sentiment ran deep. For these colonies, the decision to join the new Dominion of Canada in 1867 was fraught with uncertainty, hesitation, and a strong resistance from segments of the population. Understanding how these provinces were eventually integrated into Confederation despite strong local opposition is essential to grasp the complexities of early Canadian politics and the building of the nation.
Both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were hesitant to join Confederation from the outset. In 1865, when the Confederation project was being discussed, many in these provinces feared losing their autonomy and being overshadowed by the larger provinces of Ontario and Quebec. There was also a widespread belief that joining the union would benefit central Canada far more than the Maritime provinces, which relied heavily on their close economic ties to Britain and the United States. Furthermore, anti-Confederation voices were emboldened by the financial and political backing of American interests, particularly those who saw a weakened and fragmented British North America as beneficial to U.S. expansion.
To counteract these fears and external influences, the architects of Confederation, particularly from the Canadas (Ontario and Quebec), worked hard to win over New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Generous funding promises and economic incentives were offered to these colonies, and the prospect of infrastructure development, particularly the construction of the Intercolonial Railway, was put forward as a way to link the Maritimes more closely with the economic opportunities of central Canada. This railway, in theory, would open new markets for Nova Scotia’s industries and farmers, giving them access to the growing industrial economy of Ontario and Quebec. With these promises, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia agreed to become part of the new country, culminating in their inclusion in the British North America (BNA) Act of 1867.
However, even after Confederation was achieved on July 1, 1867, the political climate in Nova Scotia remained highly volatile. The first test came in the provincial and federal elections of September 18, 1867. The results were a resounding rejection of Confederation by the Nova Scotia electorate. In the provincial legislature, only two out of 38 members were pro-Confederation. In the federal election, only one out of 18 elected representatives from Nova Scotia supported Confederation, and that was Charles Tupper, one of the main proponents of the union and a key ally of John A. Macdonald. Joseph Howe, a towering figure in Nova Scotia politics, emerged as the leader of the anti-Confederationists and won a seat in the federal parliament, cementing his role as the most prominent opponent of the union.
This created a significant political challenge for John A. Macdonald’s new government when the Canadian Parliament convened for the first time on November 7, 1867. While Macdonald enjoyed broad support from Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick, the deep resentment from Nova Scotia threatened to undermine the fragile unity of the new country. The primary goal of the anti-Confederationists was simple: to remove Nova Scotia from Confederation. Leading this charge was Joseph Howe, who became an impassioned and determined voice against Canada’s newest political arrangement.
Howe and his allies, including Nova Scotia Premier William Annand, J.C. Troop, and H.W. Smith, wasted no time in launching a campaign to extricate Nova Scotia from Confederation. In February 1868, Howe and his delegation departed for London, hoping to appeal directly to the Imperial authorities. Their argument was rooted in the belief that Nova Scotia had been coerced into joining Confederation against the will of its people. They argued that Confederation threatened Nova Scotia’s economic and political interests and that the colony would be better served by leaving the union.
Macdonald, understanding the gravity of the situation, acted swiftly. He sent Charles Tupper, a staunch defender of Confederation, to London to counter Howe’s efforts. Both men made their cases to the British Colonial Office, but Howe’s arguments failed to gain traction. His appeals to the House of Lords and the House of Commons, which included proposals for a Royal Commission to investigate Nova Scotia’s grievances, were decisively defeated. By June 1868, Howe realized that his efforts to remove Nova Scotia from Confederation would not succeed. The British government was not willing to reverse its support for the BNA Act, and Nova Scotia’s place in the new Dominion was secure.
It was at this point that Howe began to reconsider his position. He entered into discussions with Tupper, who presented a different path forward. Rather than continuing to fight a losing battle, Tupper suggested that Howe could achieve more for Nova Scotia by working from within the federal government. By the time they returned to Canada together in August 1868, Howe had started to soften his stance. He realized that Confederation was a reality and that his best option might be to work with Macdonald’s government to secure better terms for Nova Scotia.
In August 1869, John A. Macdonald, Tupper, and key political figures like George-Étienne Cartier and opposition leader John Sandfield Macdonald traveled to Halifax to personally appeal to Howe. Their goal was to bring him into the fold of the federal government. By this point, Howe had already accepted that Confederation could not be undone, and he agreed to compromise. In exchange for better terms for Nova Scotia, including an increase in the province’s federal subsidy to match that given to New Brunswick, Howe agreed to join Macdonald’s Cabinet as Secretary of State for the Provinces in 1869.
The significance of this moment in Canadian history cannot be overstated. With Howe’s decision to join the government, the anti-Confederation movement in Nova Scotia effectively collapsed. Howe’s influence over Nova Scotia politics was immense, and his shift in position marked the end of serious efforts to remove Nova Scotia from Confederation. The union was solidified, and the inclusion of the Maritime provinces became a foundational part of Canada’s political and economic structure.
Moreover, this episode underscored the fragility of Canada’s early political unity and the challenges of nation-building in a country as vast and regionally diverse as Canada. It demonstrated the importance of compromise and negotiation in securing the participation of provinces with divergent interests and concerns. By addressing the grievances of Nova Scotia, Macdonald’s government was able to stabilize the new nation and prevent what could have been a crippling secession crisis.
In the broader context of Canadian history, the integration of Nova Scotia into Confederation represented a victory for the vision of a united Canada stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. It highlighted the delicate balance of federalism, where provincial autonomy and federal unity had to be constantly negotiated and maintained. The defeat of the anti-Confederationists in Nova Scotia also set a precedent for how future political disputes would be handled—through dialogue, compromise, and a recognition that Canada’s strength lay in its ability to accommodate regional differences within a unified national framework.
The story of Nova Scotia’s reluctant path to Confederation and the eventual triumph of compromise exemplifies the complexities of Canadian politics and the enduring challenges of nation-building. It is a reminder of how close Canada came to fracturing in its early years, and how the perseverance of leaders like Macdonald and Tupper, and even Howe, helped forge the nation we know today.
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