CANADA HISTORY - DOCUMENTS UNITED STATES

1823 The Monroe Doctrine

Analysis of the Document - (The Document follows below the Analysis)

The Monroe Doctrine, articulated by U.S. President James Monroe in 1823, was a landmark statement in Western Hemisphere geopolitics. Although primarily directed at European powers, it had significant implications for Canada and British North America. The doctrine declared that any further European colonization or intervention in the Americas would be considered an act of aggression against the United States, marking a bold assertion of American influence.

For Canada, which was still under British control, the Monroe Doctrine introduced a new dynamic in its relationship with the U.S. While it did not directly target British North America, it underscored the growing importance of the United States as a regional power. The British government was cautious in its response, recognizing that the doctrine was as much a warning to Europe as it was an indication of American expansionist tendencies.

The Monroe Doctrine also influenced Canadian history by shaping British colonial policy. Britain, aware of American ambitions, sought to reinforce its grip on its North American colonies, particularly after the War of 1812 had highlighted the vulnerabilities of British North America to American incursions. As a result, the British government began to develop a more robust strategy for defending its Canadian territories, recognizing that the region could one day face pressure from the growing American republic.

Moreover, the doctrine had an enduring impact on Canadian foreign policy in the 19th century. As the United States expanded westward, Canada’s proximity to this burgeoning power meant that British North America had to be vigilant of its southern neighbor's ambitions. The Monroe Doctrine, though initially aimed at Europe, became a symbol of American dominance in hemispheric affairs, and Canada's role as a British colony placed it in a delicate position between imperial powers.

In later years, the doctrine would also play a role in Canada's evolving relationship with Latin America. Although Canada was not directly involved in Monroe’s vision of protecting the Americas from European intervention, the doctrine helped establish a hemispheric order that shaped Canada’s position in the broader geopolitical landscape of the Americas.

Ultimately, the Monroe Doctrine’s significance for Canada lay in the ways it emphasized the growing influence of the United States in North America and set the stage for future diplomatic, territorial, and political interactions between Canada, Britain, and the U.S. It contributed to the sense that Canadian development and security were closely linked to the shifting power dynamics within the hemisphere, laying the groundwork for future decisions about Canada’s role in continental affairs and its own path to nationhood.

[The Monroe Doctrine was expressed during President Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress, December 2, 1823] . . . At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . .

It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the results have been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgement of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security. The late events in Spain and Portugal shew that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none of them more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in hope that other powers will pursue the same course. . .