CANADA HISTORY - DOCUMENTS COLONIAL

1687 January Memoir for the Marquis de Seignelay Regarding the Dangers That Threaten Canada and the Means to Remedy Them

Analysis of the Document - (The Document follows below the Analysis)

The January 1687 Memoir addressed to the Marquis de Seignelay, who was then the Minister of the Navy and Colonies under King Louis XIV, stands as a pivotal document in the early history of New France, reflecting both the fears and ambitions of French colonial officials in Canada during the late 17th century. The memo, authored by senior colonial administrators, painted a stark picture of the dangers facing the fledgling colony of New France and provided strategic recommendations to counter those threats. At its core, the document reveals a period of mounting external pressures on French territories in North America—pressures that included intensifying conflicts with the Iroquois Confederacy, the growing encroachment of English and Dutch traders, and the perennial challenges of maintaining the loyalty and cooperation of Indigenous allies. The Memoir for the Marquis de Seignelay offers invaluable insights into the geopolitical landscape of colonial North America and the fragile position of New France, a colony caught between competing European powers and a complex web of Indigenous alliances. Its implications for Canadian history are far-reaching, as it highlights the early struggle to secure French interests in North America, a struggle that would continue to define Canadian history for generations to come.

The context of the Memoir is rooted in the volatile relationship between New France and the Iroquois Confederacy, a powerful alliance of Indigenous nations that dominated much of the interior of North America. By the late 1680s, the Iroquois had become a formidable force, not only in terms of their military strength but also as key players in the fur trade, which was central to the economy of New France. French colonial officials were acutely aware that the Iroquois could disrupt the flow of furs from the Great Lakes and interior regions to Montreal and Quebec City, the economic lifeblood of the colony. More importantly, the Iroquois had proven themselves to be formidable adversaries, launching raids on French settlements and Indigenous communities allied with the French. The Memoir underscored the existential threat posed by the Iroquois, portraying them as a well-organized and highly mobile enemy capable of striking deep into French territory. The authors of the Memoir warned that if left unchecked, the Iroquois could cripple the colony and undermine France’s claim to the vast interior of the continent.

Compounding the Iroquois threat was the increasing competition from English and Dutch traders, who were steadily expanding their influence in the region. English settlements in New England and Dutch trading posts along the Hudson River were not only growing in population but also in ambition. These European powers sought to weaken France’s grip on the lucrative fur trade by offering better deals to Indigenous trappers and forging their own alliances with Indigenous nations. The Memoir expressed deep concern about the expanding English presence to the south and the Dutch to the west, both of whom were seen as eager to seize control of key trade routes and resources that France relied upon. The strategic recommendation offered in the Memoir was clear: France needed to fortify its position in North America through military and diplomatic means or risk losing its foothold in the colony entirely.

The authors of the Memoir offered several key recommendations to the Marquis de Seignelay, many of which reflected the desperate need for increased military support and the development of a stronger alliance network with Indigenous nations. First and foremost, they urged the French government to send more troops and supplies to New France to defend against Iroquois incursions. The document stressed that the colonial militia and small detachments of regular soldiers already stationed in Canada were insufficient to defend the vast, sparsely populated territory. The French settlers, concentrated in a few key areas along the St. Lawrence River, were vulnerable to raids and attacks, and without reinforcement from France, the colony could not hope to withstand sustained pressure from the Iroquois or other Indigenous groups aligned with the English or Dutch.

In addition to military reinforcement, the Memoir emphasized the importance of securing the loyalty of France’s Indigenous allies, particularly the Algonquin, Huron, and other nations that had traditionally sided with the French in their conflicts with the Iroquois. The relationship between the French and their Indigenous allies was based on mutual benefit, particularly in the fur trade, but it was also fraught with tension. French officials were keenly aware that the loyalty of their Indigenous partners could not be taken for granted, particularly if the English or Dutch offered more favorable trading terms or military support. The Memoir recommended that the French government invest in strengthening these alliances by providing gifts, trade goods, and diplomatic overtures that would bind these nations more closely to French interests. Failure to do so, the document warned, would leave New France isolated and vulnerable to the machinations of rival European powers and their Indigenous allies.

Another key recommendation in the Memoir was the construction of additional forts and defensive outposts along key strategic points in New France. The authors recognized that the vast, unfortified frontier made the colony vulnerable to both Iroquois raids and English expansion. They proposed a network of forts that would serve not only as military strongholds but also as centers of trade and diplomacy with Indigenous nations. These forts would provide much-needed security for French settlers and serve as a deterrent to Iroquois aggression. They would also allow the French to project their influence deeper into the interior of the continent, securing control over vital fur trade routes and preventing the English from establishing a foothold in the region.

The Memoir also touched on the economic challenges facing New France, particularly the colony’s reliance on the fur trade as its primary economic engine. The authors acknowledged that while the fur trade had been highly profitable in the early years of the colony, it was now under threat from both external competition and internal instability. The Iroquois raids had disrupted trade networks, and the increasing presence of English and Dutch traders was eroding France’s dominance in the market. The Memoir recommended that the French government take steps to diversify the colony’s economy, encouraging the development of agriculture and other industries that could provide a more stable economic foundation for New France. The authors suggested that increased investment in infrastructure, such as roads and transportation networks, would help integrate the colony more closely with France and make it less reliant on the fur trade.

The Memoir for the Marquis de Seignelay is significant not only for its immediate recommendations but also for the broader implications it had for the future of New France and, by extension, Canadian history. The concerns raised in the document reflected the precarious position of New France in the late 17th century, a colony caught between the ambitions of rival European powers and the complex dynamics of Indigenous diplomacy. The Memoir marked a turning point in the French government’s understanding of the challenges facing its North American territories. In response to the concerns raised, the French Crown began to take a more active role in the defense and administration of the colony, sending additional troops, building new forts, and investing in diplomatic efforts with Indigenous nations.

One of the most important outcomes of the Memoir was the increased militarization of New France. In the years that followed, French officials took steps to strengthen the colony’s defenses, culminating in the construction of key fortifications such as Fort Frontenac and later Fort Niagara. These forts became critical centers of French military and diplomatic power in the Great Lakes region, allowing the French to maintain control over the fur trade and deter English encroachment. The militarization of New France also had long-term consequences for the colony’s relationship with Indigenous nations, as the French increasingly relied on a combination of military force and diplomatic alliances to maintain their influence in the region.

The Memoir also had implications for the broader geopolitical landscape of North America. The recommendations to strengthen French control over the interior, through both military means and Indigenous diplomacy, reflected a growing awareness that the future of New France—and by extension, Canada—would be shaped by the competition between European powers for control of the continent. The document’s emphasis on securing Indigenous alliances underscored the importance of Indigenous nations as key players in this struggle. The French strategy of building alliances with Indigenous nations, which had been in place since the early days of the colony, would continue to be a defining feature of French policy in North America until the fall of New France in 1763.

In conclusion, the January 1687 Memoir for the Marquis de Seignelay Regarding the Dangers That Threaten Canada was a pivotal document in the history of New France, reflecting the colony’s precarious position in the face of external threats and internal challenges. The Memoir outlined a clear set of recommendations for strengthening the colony’s defenses, securing Indigenous alliances, and diversifying its economy, all of which had lasting implications for the development of New France. The document offers a window into the complex geopolitical dynamics of colonial North America and the early struggles that would shape the future of Canada. While the challenges facing New France in 1687 were formidable, the responses outlined in the Memoir laid the groundwork for the colony’s survival and expansion in the decades that followed, even as the larger struggle between European powers for control of the continent continued to unfold.

Canada is encompassed by many powerful Colonies of English who labor incessantly to ruin it by exciting all our Indians, and drawing them away with their peltries for which said English give them a great deal more merchandise than the French, because the former pay no duty to the King of England. That profit attracts towards them, also, all our Coureurs de bois and French libertines who carry their peltries to them, deserting our Colony and establishing themselves among the English who take great pains to encourage them. They employ these French deserters to advantage in bringing the Far Indians to them who formerly brought their peltries into our Colony, whereby our trade is wholly destroyed. The English have begun by the most powerful and best disciplined Indians of all America, whom they have excited entirely against us by their avowed protection and manifest usurpation of the sovereignty they claim over the country of those Indians which appertains beyond contradiction to the King for nearly a century without the English having, up to this present time, had any pretence thereto. They also employ the Iroquois to excite all our other Indians against us. They sent those last year to attack the Hurons and the Outawas, our most ancient subjects; from whom they swept by surprise more than 75 prisoners, including some of their principal Chiefs; killed several others, and finally offered peace and the restitution of their prisoners, if they would quit the French and acknowledge the English. They sent those Iroquois to attack the Illinois and the Miamis, our allies, who are in the neighborhood of Fort Saint Louis, built by M. de La Salle on the Illinois River which empties into the River Colbert or Mississipi; those Iroquois massacred and burnt a great number of them, and carried off many prisoners with threats of entire extermination if they would not unite with them against the French. Colonel Dongan, Governor of New-York, has pushed this usurpation to the point of sending Englishmen to take possession, in the King of England's name, of the post of Mislimakinac which is a Strait communicating between Lake Huron and the Lake of the Illinois [Lake Michigan], and has even declared that all those lakes, including the River Saint Lawrence which serves as an outlet to them, and on which our Colony is settled, belong to the English. The Reverend Father Lamberville, a French Jesuit who, with one of his brothers, also a Jesuit, has been 18 years a Missionary among the Iroquois, wrote on the first of November to Chevalier de Callieres, Governor of Montreal, who informed the Governor-General thereof, that Colonel Dongan has assembled the Five Iroquois Nations at Manatte where he resides, and declared to them as follows: 1st, That he forbids them to go to Cataracouy or Fort Frontenac and to have any more intercourse with French. 2d, That he orders them to restore the prisoners they, took from the Hurons and Outawacs, in order to attract these to him. 3d, That he is sending thirty Englishmen to take possession of Missilimakinak and the lakes, rivers and adjoining lands and orders the Iroquois to escort them thither and to afford them physical assistance. 4th, That he has sent to recall the Iroquois Christians belonging to the Mohawks who reside since a long time at the Saut Saint Louis, in the vicinity of the Island of Montreal, where they have been established by us, and converted by the care of our Reverend Jesuit Fathers, and that he would give them other land and an English Jesuit, to govern them. 5th, That he wishes that there should not be any Missionaries except his throughout the whole of the Five Nations of Iroquois, and that the latter send away our French Jesuits who have been so long established there. 6th, That if they are attacked by Monsieur de Denonville the latter will have to do with him. 7th, That he orders them to plunder all the French who will visit them; to bind them and bring them to him, and what they'll take from them shall be good prize.

The Iroquois-He accompanied his orders with presents to the Five Iroquois Nations, and dispatched his thirty Englishmen, escorted by Iroquois, to make an establishment at Missilirnakinak. The Iroquois plunder our Frenchmen every where they meet them, and threaten to fire their settlements which are much exposed and without any fortifications. These measures, and the discredit we are in among all the Indians for having abandoned our allies in M. de la Barre's time, for having suffered them to be exterminated by the Iroquois and borne the insults of the latter, render war again absolutely necessary to avert from us a general Indian Rebellion which would bring down ruin on our trade and cause eventually even the extirpation of our Colony. War is likewise necessary for the establishment of the Religion, which will never spread itself there except by the destruction of the Iroquois: so that on the success of hostilities, which the Governor-General of Canada proposes to commence against the Iroquois on the 15th of May next, depends either the ruin of the Country and of the Religion if he be not assisted, or the Establishment of the Religion, of Commerce and the King's Power over all North America, if granted the required aid. If men consider the Merit in the eyes of God, and the Glory and utility which the King will derive from that succor, it is easy to conclude that expense was never better employed since, independent of the salvation of the quantity of souls in that vast County to which His Majesty will contribute by establishing the faith there, he will secure to himself an Empire of more than a thousand leagues in extent, from the Mouth of the River Saint Lawrence to that of the River Mississippi in the Gulf of Mexico; a country discovered by the French alone, to which other Nations have no right, and from which great Commercial advantages, and a considerable augmentation of His Majesty's Revenues will eventually be derived. The Marquis de Denonville, whose zeal, industry and capacity admit of no addition, requires a reinforcement of 1,500 men to succeed in his enterprise. If less be granted him, success is doubtful and a war is made to drag along, the continuation of which for many years will be a greater expense to His Majesty than that immediately necessary to guarantee its success and prompt termination. The Iroquois must be attacked in two directions. The first and principal attack must be on the Seneca Nation on the borders of Lake Ontario, the second, by the River Richelieu and Lake Champlain in the direction of she Mohawks. Three thousand French will be required for that purpose. Of these there are sixteen companies which make 800 men and 800 drafted from the militia, 100 of the best of whom the Governor-General destines to conduct 50 canoes which will come and go incessantly to convey provisions. Of the 3,000 French he has only one-half, though he boasts of more for reputation's sake, for the rest of the militia are necessary to protect and cultivate the farms of the Colony, and a part of the force must be employed in guarding the posts of Fort - Frontenac, Niagara, Tarento Missilimakinak so as to secure the aid he expects from the Illinois and from the other Indians, on whom, however, he cannot-rely unless he will be able alone to defeat the Five Iroquois Nations. The Iroquois force consists of two thousand picked Warriors (d'elite) brave, active, more skilful in the use of the gun than our Europeans and all well armed; besides twelve hundred Mohegans (Loups), another tribe in alliance with them as brave as they, not including the English who will supply them with officers to lead them, and to intrench them in their villages. If they be not attacked all at once at the two points indicated, it is impossible to destroy them or to drive them from their retreat, but if encompassed on both sides, all their plantations of Indian corn will be destroyed, their villages burnt, their women, children and old men captured and their warriors driven into the woods where they will be pursued and annihilated by the other Indians. After having defeated and dispersed them, the winter must be spent in fortifying the post of Niagara, the most important in America, by means of which all the other Nations will be excluded from the lakes whence all the peltries are obtained; it will be necessary to winter troops at that and some other posts, to prevent the Iroquois returning and reestablishing themselves there, and to people those beautiful countries with other Indians who will have served under us during this war. As operations commence on the 15th of May, it is necessary to hasten the reinforcement and to send it off in the month of March next in order that it may arrive in season to be employed, and that it be accompanied by munitions of war and provisions, arms and other articles required in the estimates of the Governor-General and intendant of Canada. The vast extent of this country and the inconveniences respecting the command which may occur during the war suggest the great necessity of appointing a Lieutenant- Governor over it, as well to command the troops there in the absence, and under the orders, of the Governor-General as to enforce these throughout all parts of the Colony beyond the Island of Montreal towards the great lakes which are at a considerable distance from Quebec. The Marquis de Denonville who sees the necessity of establishing that office is of opinion that Chevalier de Callieres, Governor of the Island of Montreal, is eminently qualified for it by his application and industry in the King's service, and his Experience in war, said Chevalier de Callieres having served twenty years with reputation in his Majesty's armies throughout the whole of his glorious campaigns.