CANADA HISTORY - DOCUMENTS COLONIAL

1750 December Marquis de la Galissonière Memoir on the French Colonies in North America

Analysis of the Document - (The Document follows below the Analysis)

The 1750 December Memoir written by Roland-Michel Barrin, the Marquis de la Galissonière, provides a comprehensive and strategic overview of the French colonies in North America during a period of increasing tension between France and Britain. As the governor of New France from 1747 to 1749, de la Galissonière was intimately involved in the administration of France’s vast colonial empire in the New World. His memoir, crafted as a report for the French Crown, laid out the challenges and opportunities facing France’s colonial efforts in North America and sought to address the growing threat posed by British expansion. In the memo, de la Galissonière not only outlined the precarious position of New France but also offered strategic advice on how France could strengthen its grip on the continent, particularly in the face of rising British aggression in areas such as the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes region.

The Memoir on the French Colonies in North America is a significant historical document for several reasons. It represents a snapshot of French imperial strategy at a critical juncture when France and Britain were not yet in open war, but tensions were mounting as both powers vied for control of the continent. De la Galissonière’s observations and recommendations reveal the precarious nature of French control in North America, where the colonies were sparsely populated, economically underdeveloped, and reliant on alliances with Indigenous nations to maintain territorial claims. His memoir underscores the challenges of defending and expanding French influence in a region where British settlers outnumbered the French by a wide margin and where France’s resources were stretched thin across a sprawling and often inhospitable landscape.

Central to de la Galissonière’s memoir is the question of territorial control, particularly in the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes region, which were emerging as key battlegrounds in the struggle between France and Britain. For the French, these territories were not just important for their fur trade, but also as a vital link between their colonies in Canada (New France) and Louisiana. Controlling the interior of the continent allowed France to maintain a strategic corridor stretching from the St. Lawrence River through the Great Lakes and down the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico. De la Galissonière emphasized that this territory was crucial for France’s imperial ambitions and for preventing British encirclement of the French colonies. He argued that if France failed to assert its control over the Ohio Valley, the British would not only dominate the fur trade but also gain access to the interior of North America, ultimately threatening the security of New France itself.

De la Galissonière’s concerns were well-founded. By 1750, British settlers were beginning to push westward into the Ohio Valley, establishing trading posts and settlements that encroached on what the French saw as their territory. The French, who had long relied on a network of alliances with Indigenous nations to maintain control over the interior, now found themselves in competition with British traders who were offering more favorable terms to Indigenous groups. The British were also building military forts and forging alliances with the Iroquois Confederacy, a powerful Indigenous alliance that had historically been hostile to the French. In response to these developments, de la Galissonière called for a more aggressive French policy in the region, including the construction of new forts and increased military presence to secure French territorial claims.

One of the key recommendations made by de la Galissonière in the Memoir was the need to strengthen the French population in North America. He recognized that one of France’s greatest weaknesses in the colonial struggle with Britain was its relatively small population in New France. By 1750, the population of New France was around 70,000, compared to the more than one million settlers in the British colonies. De la Galissonière argued that France needed to encourage more immigration to its North American colonies, particularly by settling the fertile lands of the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes region. He believed that only by significantly increasing the French population could France hope to compete with British expansion and solidify its claims to the interior of the continent.

However, de la Galissonière’s vision for increasing the French population in North America was hampered by several factors. France’s domestic priorities were focused on Europe, and the French government was reluctant to invest heavily in its North American colonies, which were seen as peripheral to the larger geopolitical struggles in Europe. Moreover, France’s agricultural policies and labor shortages at home made it difficult to convince large numbers of settlers to emigrate to New France. This reluctance to invest in the colonies, despite the warnings in de la Galissonière’s memoir, would ultimately contribute to France’s failure to compete effectively with British expansion in North America.

Another key theme in de la Galissonière’s Memoir is the importance of maintaining and strengthening alliances with Indigenous nations. The French had long relied on these alliances to extend their influence into the interior of North America, particularly through the fur trade. De la Galissonière recognized that the Indigenous nations were crucial not only as trading partners but also as military allies who could help defend French interests against both British settlers and rival Indigenous groups. He argued that France needed to take more active steps to secure the loyalty of its Indigenous allies, particularly by offering better terms in trade and by providing military support when needed. He warned that if France did not act quickly, the British would succeed in drawing these nations away from their French alliances, further weakening France’s position in North America.

The Memoir also highlights the strategic importance of France’s network of forts in North America, which served both as trading posts and as military outposts for defending French claims to territory. De la Galissonière advocated for the construction of additional forts, particularly in the Ohio Valley and along the Great Lakes, to counter British expansion. He understood that control of these key locations was essential for maintaining French dominance in the fur trade and for preventing British settlers from moving westward. These forts were not only physical symbols of French presence but also centers of diplomacy, where French officials could negotiate with Indigenous nations and reinforce alliances.

The Memoir on the French Colonies in North America ultimately reflects the growing sense of urgency among French officials as they watched British expansionism threaten their empire in the New World. De la Galissonière’s strategic recommendations—strengthening the population, building alliances with Indigenous nations, and constructing more forts—were all aimed at countering the British threat and preserving France’s colonial empire in North America. Yet, despite his prescient warnings and detailed proposals, many of de la Galissonière’s recommendations were not fully implemented, largely due to France’s focus on European conflicts and its failure to prioritize the defense of its North American colonies.

In the broader context of Canadian history, de la Galissonière’s Memoir is a critical document that helps explain the eventual downfall of New France. The tensions outlined in the Memoir would soon erupt into open conflict, with the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) becoming the defining struggle between France and Britain for control of North America. Despite the construction of key forts such as Fort Duquesne, France was unable to stop the British from advancing into the Ohio Valley, and the war culminated in the loss of New France to the British in 1763 with the Treaty of Paris. De la Galissonière’s analysis of the French colonies’ vulnerabilities and his calls for action proved to be accurate, but his warnings came too late to prevent the eventual collapse of French power in North America.

For Canada, the Memoir has lasting significance. The fall of New France marked a turning point in the history of the continent, leading to the establishment of British rule in what is now Canada. The shift in power from French to British control set the stage for the development of Canadian political, cultural, and social institutions, while also ensuring that the French-speaking population of Quebec would remain a distinct and enduring part of Canada’s identity. De la Galissonière’s vision of a strengthened French colony, populated by more settlers and defended by strong alliances with Indigenous nations, would not come to fruition, but his efforts to preserve French influence in North America left a lasting legacy in the form of Quebec’s continued French cultural identity.

In conclusion, the 1750 December Memoir by the Marquis de la Galissonière is a vital document for understanding the French colonial strategy in North America during a critical period of imperial rivalry. It offers a detailed and strategic vision for how France could counter British aggression and maintain its hold on the continent. The Memoir highlights the key challenges facing New France, including the need for population growth, stronger alliances with Indigenous nations, and more robust military defenses. Although many of de la Galissonière’s recommendations were not fully realized, the document provides invaluable insight into the geopolitical dynamics of the time and the reasons for France’s eventual defeat in North America. The Memoir remains an important piece of Canadian history, illustrating the complex and often precarious nature of colonial power in the New World and the forces that shaped the future of Canada.

Motives of honor, glory and religion forbid the abandonment of an established Colony; the surrender to themselves, or rather to a nation inimical by taste, education and religious principle, of the French who have emigrated thither at the persuasion of the Government with the expectation of its protection, and who eminently deserve it on account of their fidelity and attachment; in fine, the giving up of so salutary a work as that of the conversion of the heathen who inhabit that vast Continent. Yet we shall not insist on these motives; and how great soever may be the inconveniences set forth in the preceding article, neither will we object to them, the future and uncertain revenues both of Canada and of Louisiana, although nevertheless, these are extremely probable, since they have for basis an immense country, a numerous people, fertile lands, forests of mulberry trees, mines already discovered, etc. We shall confine ourselves to regarding Canada as a barren frontier, such as the Alps are to Piedmont, as Luxembourg would be to France, and as it, perhaps, is to the Queen of Hungary. We ask if a country can be abandoned, no matter how bad it may be, or what the amount of expense necessary to sustain it, when by its position it affords a great advantage over its neighbors. This is precisely the case of Canada: it cannot be denied that this Colony has been always a burthen to France, and it is probable that such will be the case for a long while; but it constitutes, at the same time, the strongest barrier that can be opposed to the ambition of the English. We may dispense with giving any other proofs of this than the constant efforts they have made, for more than a century, against that Colony. We will add, however, that it alone is in a position to wage war against them in all their possessions on the Continent of America; possessions which are as dear to them as they are precious in fact, whose power is daily increasing, and which, if means be not found to prevent it, will soon absorb not only all the Colonies located in the neighboring islands of the Tropic, but even all those of the Continent of America. Long Experience has proved that the preservation of the major portion of the settlements in the Tropical islands is not owing so much to their intrinsic strength, as to the difficulty of conveying troops thither from Europe in sufficient numbers to subjugate or keep them, and of supporting such troops there; but if the rapid progress of the English Colonies on the Continent be not arrested, or what amounts to the same thing, if a counterpoise capable of confining them within their limits, and of forcing them to the defensive, be not formed, they will possess, in a short time, such great facilities to construct formidable armaments on the Continent of America, and will require so little time to convey a large force either to St. Domingo or to the Island of Cuba, or to our Windward islands, that it will not be possible to hope to preserve these except at an enormous expense. This will not be the case if we make a more energetic and generous effort to increase and strengthen Canada and Louisiana, than the English are making in favor of their Colonies; since the French Colonies, despite their destitute condition, have always waged war against the English of the Continent with some advantage, though the latter are, and always have been, more numerous; it is necessary to explain here the causes to which this has been owing. The first is the great number of alliances that French keep up with the Indian Nations. These people, who hardly act except from instinct, love us hitherto a little and fear us a great deal, more than they do the English; but their interest, which some among them begin to understand, is that the strength of the English and French remain nearly equal, so that through the jealousy of these two nations those tribes may live independent of, and draw presents from, both. The second reason of our superiority over the English is, the number of French Canadians who are accustomed to live in the woods like the Indians, and become thereby not only qualified to lead them to fight the English, but to wage war even against these same Indians when necessity obliges. Hence `twill be seen that this superiority of the French in America is in some sort accidental, and if they neglect to maintain it, whilst the English are making every effort to destroy it, `twill pass into the hands of the latter. There is no doubt but such an event would be followed by the entire destruction of our settlements in that part of the Globe. This, however serious it may seem, would not be our only loss; it would drag after it that of the superiority which France must claim over England. If anything can, in fact, destroy the superiority of France in Europe, it is the Naval force of the English; this alone sustained the house of Austria at the commencement of the war of the Spanish succession, as it caused France to lose, at the close of the last war, the fruit of the entire conquest of the Austrian Lower Countries. We must not flatter ourselves with being able long to sustain an expenditure equal to theirs; no other resource remains then but to attack them in their possessions; that cannot be effected by forces sent from Europe except with little hope of success, and at vast expense, whilst by fortifying ourselves in America and husbanding means in the Colonies themselves, the advantages we possess can be preserved, and even increased at a very trifling expense, in comparison with the cost of expeditions fitted out in Europe. The utility of Canada is not confined to the preservation of the French Colonies, and to rendering the English apprehensive for theirs; that Colony is not less essential for the conservation of the Spanish possessions in America, especially of Mexico. So long as that barrier is well secured; so long as the English will be unable to penetrate it; so long as efforts will be made to increase its strength, `twill serve as a rampart to Louisiana, which hitherto sustains itself only under the shadow of the forces of Canada, and by the connection of the Canadians with the Indians. Should any unforeseen revolution disturb the intimate union now existing between the two Crowns, we should even be able, by means of Louisiana, to share with the Spaniards the profit of the rich settlements they possess in America; but this event appears so distant, that it is the opinion that France, for its own interest, and in order to remove every jealousy, must not seek to extend its possessions Westward, that is to say, towards the Spaniards, but apply all its resources to strengthen itself at the East, that is, in the direction of the English. In fine, Canada, the fertility whereof is wonderful, can serve as the granary of the Tropical Colonies, which, in consequence of the men they destroy, sell their rich products very dear. It is proved that the number of Canadians who die in these Colonies that are admitted to be the most unhealthy, is much less than that of European French. All that precedes sufficiently demonstrates that it is of the utmost importance and of absolute necessity not to omit any means, nor spare any expense to secure Canada, inasmuch as that is the only way to wrest America from the ambition of the English, and as the progress of their empire in that quarter of the globe is what is most capable of contributing to their superiority in Europe.